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DEVELOPMENT
Soviet Human Rights Under Gorbachev: Old
Wine in a New Bottle?
In times of crisis, nearly everything may depend on the regard and
confidence placed in some man who possesses the experience and
qualities of a leader.1
Plutarch
I. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet government has through its seventy year history fre-
quently been criticized by Western governments for its unfavorable rec-
ord on human rights. Following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and
Lenin's short rule, the Soviet people endured twenty-four years of hegem-
ony under Joseph Stalin. As a result of Stalin's intentions to create an
industrial and military power, numerous hard-line policies were formed,
some of which still remain today.
Gorbachev's ascent to power has brought the area of human rights
into an evolving and dynamic period. He has introduced "glasnost," a
policy where through the devices of criticism and monitoring by the
masses, the Soviets can be assured of a more healthy and prosperous soci-
ety. In order to achieve this there has been a relaxation in government
policy towards censorship, demonstrations, and prisoners. Most academi-
cians have found it premature to voice a decisive opinion on whether
human rights have in fact improved, mainly because the Gorbachev ad-
ministration is so new at coping with these issues.
The strained issue of human rights, which has been a major obstacle
in East-West relations has been somewhat diminished. Developments wit-
nessed in freedom of expression and movement might not completely sat-
isfy Western demands, however the steps which have been taken by the
Soviets do not appear to be mere token gestures. This article will begin
with a historical background of human rights in the Soviet Union tracing
the developments from Stalin to Krushchev to Gorbachev.2 The central
part of this article will discuss recent developments in five primary areas
of Soviet human rights: political prisoners; minority and religious prison-
1. PLUTARCH, MORALIA, COLLECTED WORKS OF PLUTARCH 340 (3d ed. 1951).
2. For studies on Gorbachev, see CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. 85-858F; and
Simis, The Gorbachev Generation, 59 FOREIGN POL'Y 3 (1985).
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ers; demonstrations; censorship; and emigration. Finally, this article will
inspect the effectiveness of glasnost and whether Gorbachev's policies will
persevere.
II. BACKGROUND
Upon reading the Constitution of the Soviet Socialist Republics, one
is struck by the remarkable likeness of its articles regarding individual
rights and liberties to the United States' Bill of Rights. The most signifi-
cant article in this respect is Article 50, which states: "In accordance with
the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the
socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech,
of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demon-
strations."8 Despite the similarity in language, the judicial interpretation
by Soviet courts has clearly not been as generous as their U.S. counter-
parts. Since 1918, the value of Art. 50 has been comparable to a lead
statue leafed in gold. It gives a striking and majestic first impression,
however, merely scraping the exterior reveals its true worth. It is also
astonishing that individual liberties were stressed by the most ruthless of
all Soviet leaders, Joseph Stalin, who once wrote:
Real liberty can be had only where exploitation is destroyed, where
there is no oppression of one people by another, where there is no
unemployment, and pauperism, where a person does not shiver in fear
of losing tomorrow his job, home, or bread. Only in such a society is it
possible to have real, and not paper, liberty, personal and otherwise."
Despite this hypocritical statement by Stalin, many rights formally
affirmed by the Supreme Law of the Soviet remained "dead letters" for
over two decades after 1936. Freedom of speech, press, assembly and as-
sociation, and inviolability of persons' homes and correspondence were
more often breached than obeyed; something which was acknowledged at
the XXth Party Congress and by succeeding Soviet leaders.'
After the death of Stalin in March 1953, significant progress was
made in the area of personal and social rights. However, the Soviet state
has still remained a totalitarian one party oligarchy in which political ac-
tivity opposing the government on basically any issue is barred, and free-
dom of expression will be permitted only within the limits of the existent
"party-line."'
3. KONST. SSSR, art. 50 (revised and adopted 1977). In comparison, Amendment I of
the Bill of Rights states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or for the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Izvestia, Dec. 8, 1936, at 1 (article by Stalin).
5. F. SCHUMAN, RUSSIA SINCE 1917, at 231-236 (2d ed. 1979).
6. D. BRAHAM, SOVIET POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 392 (2d ed. 1975). See also J. HAZARD,
MANAGING CHANGE IN THE USSR (1983).
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It is justifiable to state that the Communist human rights movement
was initiated by Nikita Krushchev. As a counter-reaction to the harsher
policies of Stalin, Krushchev liberated millions of people from prisons.7
Krushchev's motives were not based on benevolence or deep-felt sympa-
thy, instead, he had three broad motives for liberalizing human rights in
the Soviet Union. First, he sought to set in motion the extensive human
resources of the Soviet Union after a prolonged period of stagnation. Sec-
ond, he wanted to satisfy the West's desire for concessions on human
rights issues. And third, he wished to improve the general atmosphere of
East-West relations in order to facilitate increased trade and arms con-
trol. Gorbachev is motivated by very similar goals. Like Krushchev,
Gorbachev has concluded that in order to restore health to the economy,"
and to narrow the technological deficiency towards the West, it is essen-
tial to mobilize the so-called "creative intelligentsia" on his side. This is a
strong and radical prescription to cure the illness which is plaguing the
Soviet system.'
Human rights issues in the Soviet Union have been influenced by the
United Nations Covenant on Human Rights of 1973, which was ratified
by the Soviet Union. 10 In addition, the Soviets signed the final act of the
"Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975," better
known as the "Helsinki Accord."' 1 Though the Accord is not a treaty, and
is therefore not legally binding, it has been treated almost as a legal com-
mitment by the signatory states. It seems quite probable that both of
these agreements have influenced the current Soviet leadership in its po-
sition on human rights. For example, the Soviet Union has begun to real-
7. V. CHALIDZE, PRAVA CHELOVEKA I SOVETSKI SoIuz (1974). English: To DEFEND THESE
RIGHTS 51 (1974). See also R. MEDVEDEV, KNIGA 0 SOTSIALISTISHESKoI DEMOKRATII (1972).
English: ON SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY (1975). Both of these experts believe that the Soviet sys-
tem would be acceptable to the rest of the world community if the Soviets would adhere to
their own constitutional rights guarantees.
8. It is important to note the economic developments in the USSR; examples being in
annual rates of growth: Total GNP: [1961-65] 5.0% p.a., [1984] 2.5% p.a.; Consumption:
[1961-65] 3.7% p.a., [1984] 3.0% p.a.; Investment: [1961-65] 7.5% p.a., [1984] 1.7% p.a.
Further statistics can be found in CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics, C.P.A.S. 85-10001
(1985), at 64-65.
9. See CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, REP. No. 86-87 F [hereinafter CRS 86]. This is an
excellent report from the XXVIIth Soviet Communist Party Congress.
10. Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR No. 40 item 4564 (1973); ratification on Sept. 18, 1973.
11. Text of the Final Act can be found in 73 Dep't State Bull. 323 (1975), or in 14
I.L.M. 1292 (1975). Pertinent sections concerning human rights are Principle VII and Bas-
ket III. Principle VII deals with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The
most significant section states that: "The participating States will respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Under the section for coopera-
tion in humanitarian and other fields, Basket III covered cooperation regarding family unifi-
cation, travel, sports, activities, and freer and wider dissemination of information. See gen-
erally APPRAISAL OF ITS RAMIFICATIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
HELSINKI ACCORD (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977); Coughlin, Monitoring of the Helsinki Accords:
Belgrade 1977, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 511 (1977).
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ize that a nation state's method of treating its population is not solely a
domestic concern.
2
Socio-economic conditions have reached such a low ebb in the USSR
that outsiders do not hesitate to speak of a crisis in the country's internal
metabolism. This crisis began with Leonid Brezhnev, and accentuated in
the last ten years of that regimes existence, the crisis lingered on into the
paralyzing interregnum of the early 1980's. To the Soviets, this lethargy
would imply a threat to the viability of their political system, together
with prediction of imminent discontinuities. In short, there is a crisis of
effectiveness.
Gorbachev's liberalization of the system has been cloaked in the term
"glasnost," which can be interpreted as greater openness in public life,
candor, and self-criticism. Interestingly enough, this term was also used
by Lenin.'3 Possibly the best interpretation of glasnost is democratization
of the system. Glasnost may be the boldest act by a Soviet leader since
1917. How exactly does glasnost fit into the Gorbachev administration's
overall strategy? The name of the strategy is perestroika, or economic
restructuring. Gorbachev calls perestroika "a revolution,"" one which
most likely will take years to achieve. He reinforces this contention by
stating that: "we need glasnost as we need the air.""' Without it, the So-
viet Union will most likely stagnate, will fail to compete in the world, and
will be vulnerable to outside pressures. Glasnost came first, creating the
freer atmosphere in which the drive for democratization has been
launched in earnest. Glasnost and perestroika now mean two things in
the human rights sector: 1) they are weapons Gorbachev has handed to
the Russian intellectuals meant to destroy inefficiency in the bureaucracy;
and, 2) they are an entrance back into the "normal" life for individuals
who had been wrongly imprisoned."
In his concluding speech to the Central Committee on January 28,
1987, Gorbachev spoke about glasnost: "The Communist Party firmly
holds that the people should know everything. Glasnost, criticism, and
self-criticism, monitoring by the masses - these are the guarantees of the
healthy development of Soviet society. The people must know everything
and consciously make judgments about everything.' 7 While the glasnost
policies of the Gorbachev leadership are essentially identical to the ones
of the Krushchev leadership, they have manifested as more systematic
12. See Henkin, The U.N. and Human Rights, 19 INT'L ORG. 504 (1965), and, CONG.
RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. IB83066, at 15. Previously, whenever a country or organization
criticized the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, the Soviet government would al-
ways counter with the argument that human rights were domestic and not international
issues. Glasnost appears to be causing greater deference to human rights agreements, which
in turn changes the Soviet stance on issues of international domestic concern.
13. Wash. Post, March 22, 1987, sec. C, at 7, col. c.
14. M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA 49 (1987).
15. Id. at 78.
16. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1987, sec. 4, at 2, col. 1.
17. Pravda, Jan. 29, 1987, at 1.
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and calculated, and have surpassed Krushchev's in scope and radicality.
To carry out his strategy, Gorbachev believes that the vast "untap-
ped resources of socialism" must be mobilized. Central planning and the
latest technology are crucial, but the least used resource is the human
factor. The Party must arouse the Soviet people from their apathy and
convince them that they all have a stake in the success of perestroika.
According to Gorbachev, this requires "the serious, deep democratization
of Soviet society . . . which will enable us to involve in reconstruction its
decisive strength - the people . . . . We need democracy like air. If we
don't understand this . .. our policies will founder and reconstruction
will collapse, comrades."' 8 In another speech, Gorbachev states that "we
need such powerful forms of democracy as glasnost, criticism and self-
criticism, to change radically every area of social life." Concluding, he
professed that "the more democracy we have, the faster we shall advance
along the road of reconstruction and social renewal, and the more order
and discipline we shall have in our socialist house. So is it either democ-
racy or social inertia and conservatism. There is no third way, com-
rades."' 9 It has been noted that this democratization process must be
somewhat tempered; a high-ranking editor states that "for Gorbachev to
be too far ahead of the people is not good." 0
Despite these extremely positive remarks by the Soviet leader, the
Westerner must be cautious not to overreact. Regardless of these inten-
tions of democratization, the USSR will continue with its socialist ideol-
ogy."' Glasnost's basic function is not to stimulate democracy, but instead
to encourage efficiency and industrial development. As Gorbachev himself
states in his book Perestroika: "those in the west who expect to give up
socialism will be disappointed." 2 In a July 1987 speech he stressed ex-
actly this point: "We intend to make socialism stronger, not replace it
with another system.
2 3
The issue thus becomes: can Gorbachev hope to succeed where
Krushchev failed? Is there evidence yet of a real shift in the Soviet han-
dling of human rights, or is this another Potemkin's village, what the
18. Pravda, Jan. 30, 1987, at 1. (Gorbachev's concluding speech at the Plenum of the
Central Committee).
19. Pravda, Feb. 26, 1987, at 1.
20. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1987, sec. 1, at 4, col. 1.
21. Id., sec. 1, at 7, col. 2. (text from Gorbachev's speech on the 70th anniversary of the
Russian revolution), which states: ". . . people must be taught in practice to live in the
conditions of deepening democracy, to extend and consolidate human rights, to nurture a
contemporary political culture of the masses; in other words, to teach and to learn democ-
racy ...perestroika will not succeed without a drastic invigoration of the activities of all
party organizations ...and so we must have a more businesslike and a more democratic
attitude, we must improve organization and tighten discipline ...then we will be able to
put perestroika into high gear and impart a new impetus to socialism in its development."
22. M. GORBACHEV supra note 14, at 37.
23. Time, July 27, 1987, at 31. See also Wash. Post, July 15, 1987, sec. A, at 16, col. a.
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Russians call pokazuka, or "just for show"? 2' To put flesh on the bones of
this skeletal conundrum, one must consider the five primary groups of
human rights issues in the Soviet Union: political prisoners; minority and
religious prisoners; demonstrations; censorship and emigration.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
A. Political Prisoners
Gorbachev understands that economic reforms cannot be truly effec-
tive without social reforms. For this reason, professional people in the
Soviet Union can expect better relations with the ruling authorities. In
addition, if concessions were made to dissidents, the reform coalition of
glasnost would most likely be strengthened. Other sections of the intelli-
gentsia are being satisfied with relaxed cultural controls, and increased
glasnost in scholarship, literature, and the arts. Most important is the
recent release from imprisonment of people who have close connections to
the intelligentsia. This should be considered an extremely strong political
gesture by the Kremlin. The United States State Department has an-
nounced that there are approximately 700 prisoners convicted for subver-
sive activities in Soviet prisons and camps.26 In February 1987, 140 pris-
oners who had been serving time for conducting "anti-Soviet agitation
and propaganda" were pardoned by a decree from the government.26 In-
cluded in those released were Anatoly Koryagin, Aleksandr Ogorodnikov,
and Iosef Begun.17
In the short term, the release of political prisoners has yielded sub-
stantial gains beyond merely gratifying the liberal intelligentsia. Though
the releases were clearly convincing developments, the unfortunate deaths
in prison of several human rights advocates emphasized the dangerous
position of thousands of Soviet dissidents.2" After his release from exile in
Gorky, 9 Andrei Sakharov has been openly spreading favorable publicity,
without compromising his integrity, calling for support of Gorbachev's
general line.30 Many feel that with each step Gorbachev takes in this en-
terprise, he is coinstantaneously increasing 1) his own open-mindedness,
2) the esteem of a substantial part of the population, and 3) the support
to battle the opponents of glasnost.31
24. See Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1987, sec. A, at 18, col. e.
25. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 6.
26. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 2.
27. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. 87-551 F, at 12; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1987, sec.
1, at 1, col. 1. According to an estimate by Amnesty International, the group freed repre-
sented ca. one-third of the so-called "prisoners of conscience."
28. See N.Y. Times, supra note 25.
29. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. 87-551 F, at 10 [hereinafter CRS 87].
30. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 2; see also, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1987,




Another significant development in the area of political prisoners
concerns the laws commonly used to place dissenters in labor camps; the
statutes governing "anti-Soviet propaganda" and "slandering the Soviet
State." These laws still remain on the books, however, there is high level
speculation that they will be tempered or repealed."s If this change be-
comes a reality, it would be significant evidence of the Soviet's desire for
change. According to Gennadi Gerasimov, spokesman for the Soviet for-
eign ministry, many of the pardons granted political prisoners were part
of a review of the Criminal Code "so that we have fewer people behind
bars and behind barbed wire.""3 Other Soviet officials stated that pardons
and related measures reflect a genuine determination by Gorbachev to
expand the limits of acceptable dissent. 4 Most recently, Gerasimov
stated that a general amnesty would be declared, one which would alleg-
edly release hundreds of prisoners. This would be the first amnesty in the
history of the Soviet Union relating only to individuals sentenced for po-
litical crimes.3 5
B. Minority and Religious Prisoners
Since the early 1930's, minorities and strongly religious individuals
have been persecuted and harassed.36 Today, it appears that the govern-
ment is taking a obdurate position regarding the treatment of national
minorities (such as Volga Germans, Armenians, and Ukrainians) and reli-
gious dissidents (primarily Jews, Baptists and Pentecostals). According to
a recent report, there has been a small number of national minority pris-
oners released, but no religious prisoners.3 7 It is important to emphasize
that only a minuscule portion of the several thousands of religious prison-
ers have so far been released, and some freed prisoners have been
threatened with arrests if they do not maintain silence. Also of impor-
32. The criminal law provisions which have been most frequently employed are: 1) Law
on Crimes Against the State Art. 7, and Art. 70 of the UK RSFSR Criminal Code, which
prohibits anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda; Art. 190-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code,
which makes it a crime to circulate statements known to be false which are defamatory to
the Soviet system; Art. 64 of the UK RSFSR Criminal Code, which provides for the death
penalty or lengthy prison sentences for treason; Art. 209-1 of the UK RSFSR Criminal
Code, which prohibits "malicious evasion of performance of decision concerning arrange-
ment of work and discontinuance of parasitic existence;" and, Art. 206 of the UK RSFSR
Criminal Code, which prohibits "malicious hooliganism," which is defined as any intentional
act violating public order and expressing "clear disrespect for society" which is committed
with "exceptional cynicism or special impudence." For an interesting view of why the dis-
senters should be punished, see article in Pravda, Feb. 12, 1977, at 4, which expressed the
previous Soviet leadership's views.
33. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1987, sec 1, at 1, col. 1.
34. Id.
35. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 14.
36. R. MEDVEDEV ON SOCIALIsT DEMOCRACY 166 (1975); and A. MARCHENKO, MY TESTI-
MONY 71 (1969).
37. Report from the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, June 1987, at 1
[hereinafter Kennan].
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tance is the fact that some of the religious prisoners have come from the
ranks of the Russian Orthodox Church. An interesting, though possibly
insignificant, development occurred during this last summer, when Rev.
Gleb Yakunin was freed from imprisonment, and thereafter reinstated by
the Russian Orthodox Church. 8
C. Demonstrations
During the past year a few demonstrations have occurred in Moscow,
the city which is considered the showcase of liberalism. However, even in
Moscow, some demonstrations are still being dispersed by strong-armed
methods. An example would be the open demonstration by Jews pro-
testing the imprisonment of Jewish dissident Iosif Begun. This demon-
stration was promptly quashed by the authorities, who through plain-
clothes policemen pushed and hit demonstrators. 9 In addition, undesir-
able demonstrations have been preempted by systematic house arrests. 0
An opposite reaction by the authorities occurred at a demonstration by
300 Taters at the Kremlin gate. The demonstration concerned the Taters
desire to return to the Crimea, from where they had been deported in
1944. The police did nothing to stop the noisy demonstration, merely ob-
serving it from a distance." In addition, the Kremlin permitted a meeting
between President Andrei Gromyko and the Taters. However, Gromyko
warned the Taters that to continue to pressure the government would not
be in furtherance of their interests."2 Other demonstrations not disturbed
by the authorities involved Soviet Hare Krishnas, who demonstrated in
public, asking permission to practice their faith more freely,43 and a group
of 400 Russian nationalists from the Pamyat organization, who called for
a return to orthodox Leninism. 4' The latter group was permitted to meet
with the head of the Moscow Communist Party, Boris Yeltsin. Though
the authorities have seemed more inclined to tolerate small, unofficial
demonstrations and dissident news conferences, various Soviet spokes-
men have alluded that the regime will not tolerate very much in the way
of free-spoken dissent.'5
D. Censorship
Gorbachev has commented that "the press must become even more
effective. ' ' "6 In addition, he "wishes to emphasize that the press should
unite and mobilize people rather than disuniting them and generating of-
38. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, sec. 1, at 4, col. 3.
39. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1987, sec 1, at 1, col. 2.
40. See Kennan, supra note 37.
41. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1987, sec. 1, at 3, col. 4.
42. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, sec. 1, at 3, col. 2.
43. Wash. Post, May 2, 1987, sec. A, at 17, col. a.
44. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 14.
45. See N.Y. Times, April 19, 1987, sec. 1, at 14, col. 1.
46. U.S. News and World Report, Nov. 9, 1987, at 74.
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fense and a lack of confidence. Criticism can be an effective instrument of
perestroika only if it is based on absolute truth and scrupulous concern
for justice.""' The most dramatic developments in this area have been
reports in the press discussing economic problems, corruption, and sub-
jects such as suicide, drug use, and rising criminal rates, though these
have been controlled by the leadership. 8 The media has also found itself
engaged in setting forth viewpoints on moral and cultural values.
An additional development is the increased frankness by the media
concerning accidents and natural disasters. Even though glasnost clearly
failed the test in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, due
to the unfortunate failure of swiftly reporting it before Swedish authori-
ties did, it was that failure which seems to have hastened the quick im-
provements that have occurred since the accident. Proof can be found in
the accident between a passenger liner and a cargo vessel, in which 398
people were killed. The reports from the Soviets were not sketchy or
delayed, but were instead quite candid.' 9
Regardless of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, there are limits to the
extent in which censorship can be lifted. Gorbachev conveyed his ap-
proach to such matters at the January plenum, by stating:
If someone tries to use our extensive glasnost and the democratic pro-
cess for his own selfish and anti-social purposes, for the purpose of
blackening everything, will we really - with such a powerful Party,
with such a patriotic people devoted to the ideas of socialism and to
its Motherland - not be able to cope with the situation."'
Here, Gorbachev appears to be stressing that glasnost is not a broad-
sword which the individual may swing as he pleases against the curtain of
freedom. It will be the Soviet society as a whole who shall decide exactly
how far that curtain shall be opened. Individualism is therefore limited.
Furthermore, it seems clear that the press must be subservient to fulfill
the Party's plan.
In discussions of foreign policy matters, glasnost has had less success.
Real Soviet motivations and negotiating positions are still too secret to be
debated by the Soviet public. Nevertheless, western officials, such as Ed-
ward Kennedy, Margaret Thatcher, and George Schultz have been per-
mitted to voice harsh views on Soviet television."' Most recently, the state
publishing company has voiced its desire to publish the autobiography of
super-capitalist Lee Iacocca. 52 Hints of an apparent desire by some ele-
ments in the leadership, possibly Gorbachev, to withdraw from Afghani-
47. Id.; see also Wash. Post, July 1, 1987, sec. A, at 1, col. b. (report on the Soviet
legislature's approval of some of Gorbachev's reforms, including freer speech).
48. See Kennan, supra note 37.
49. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 8.
50. NY. Times, Jan. 28, 1987, sec. 1, at 8, col. 1.
51. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 5. See also Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 1987, sec. D, at I,
col. c. This article noted that Pravda began publishing commentary from Western press.
52. Newsweek, Sept. 7, 1987, at 5.
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stan were made when a letter by a prominent emigre was permitted to be
published in a Moscow newspaper. The letter challenged Gorbachev to
withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. As a counter-reaction,
Pravda criticized the letter," but the mere fact that a letter of this type
was published is truly revolutionary.
The increased cultural freedom has led to decisions to publish long-
suppressed works by writers such as Boris Pasternak, author of Doctor
Zhivago.54 Another book which would never have been published two
years ago is Anatoly Rybakov's novel chronicling the terror under Sta-
lin.5 The Soviet cinema is also changing. "Commissar," which is a twenty
year old film on anti-semitism, was shown at the recent Moscow Film
Festival. 6
The fierce ongoing struggle in the Kremlin between the liberal
Gorbachev trend and the conservatives is reflected in the equally fero-
cious conflicts of cultural life. The Kremlin's second in command, Yegor
Ligachev, lashed out on the developments by criticizing that enough focus
is not being directed towards the classics.5 7 Among the literary-political
publications, those controlled by conservatives (e.g. Zvezda and Liter-
aturnaya Rossiya) continue jousting with those edited by the liberals (e.g.
Ogonyok and Novyi Mir).
Numerous new journals have sprouted out of these developments.
One of these journals is named Glasnost, and is written by a group of
dissidents and freed political prisoners." Another journal, edited by the
known dissident Sergei Grigoryants, apparently contained articles of a
sort not seen in the Soviet Union since the 1920's.1 Due to the recent
uncharacteristic use of truth in the press, the population has reacted by
purchasing more magazines and newspapers. 0
For the present, glasnost's prospects in this field seem quite good.
Most of the influential positions are now in the hands of people who favor
it, such as the head of state publishing, Nenasev; the Minister of Culture,
Zakharov; and the editor of the Moscow News, Yakovlev. This group is
clearly empowered to influence the arts by thrusting back the boundaries
of censorship.
53. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1987, sec. 1, at 10, col. 3.
54. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 7 and 12; N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1987, sec. 1, at 5,
col. 1; Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1987, sec. A, at 1, col. a; Newsweek, Nov. 9, 1987, at 10. Pasternak
was denounced and expelled from the Soviet Writers Union in 1958 for "anti-Soviet"
writing.
55. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 2.
56. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1987, sec. 1, at 3, col. 3. Of plays, "The Brest Peace" by
Mikhail Shatrov, and "Requiem" by Anna Akhmatova have been permitted to be per-
formed. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 14.
57. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 3.
58. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1987, sec. 1, at 12, col. 3.
59. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1987, sec. 1, at 27, col. 3.




The past decades have seen drastic reductions and increases in emi-
gration. During Stalin's years there was virtually no emigration. Brezhnev
reacted quite to the contrary, by permitting 260,000 Jews to leave in the
1970's. During the interregnum between Brezhnev and Gorbachev, per-
mission to emigrate slowed to a trickle. Since entering office, Gorbachev
has hinted that emigration restrictions may be relaxed."' In considering
this issue, Gorbachev must weigh many factors, including the fact that
the Jewish population is the most educated of all the nationalities in the
Soviet Union. Permitting emigration on a grandiose scale may not prove
itself an asset to the Soviet state. Quite contrary, the Soviet Union would
lose not only some of its greatest minds, but also some of its greatest
artists. There are Soviet officials who have stated that there is no political
dividend to be gained by an open policy of emigration." It should be
remembered that emigration has never been considered a right in the So-
viet Union,6s and that the handling of emigration policies has always been
an internal affair. It appears that this position is softening, possibly influ-
enced by the Helsinki Accord."'
According to some estimates, there are 11,000 refusniks in the Soviet
Union who have applied for exit visas,65 and nearly 400,000 who have
shown interest in leaving.6 Other nationalities which have shown interest
in leaving are the Germans and the Armenians. According to official West
German reports there are 100,000 Germans who wish to emigrate, while
German repatriation organizations believe that there are 300,000. There
are reports that possibly 200,000 Armenians would leave if permitted., In
1986, the Soviet government permitted 914 Jews to leave, less than in
1985 when 1140 left the Soviet Union. Currently, emigration of Jews has
risen strongly, as 5,398 people have so far been permitted to emigrate.
German and Armenian emigration has also increased."
Despite these positive developments, a new emigration law has been
introduced, restricting emigration to those who receive invitations from
immediate family members. Under this new emigration law, only 30,000
to 40,000 individuals would be eligible to leave. 9 This law, which went
into effect in January 1987, is a great deal tougher, not liberal, and may
be considered a potential source of foreign and domestic tension. If the
61. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. 1B 82080, at 2 [hereinafter CRS IB].
62. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1987, sec. 1, at 5, col. 1.
63. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1987, sec. 1, at 12, col. 2.
64. See CRS IB supra note 61, at 3.
65. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1987, sec. 1, at 27, col. 2.
66. See CRS 1B supra note 61, at 5.
67. Id. at 6-7.
68. Id. at 9. German emigration: 1986 - 753, 1987 - 3,550; Armenian emigration: 1986 -
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Soviets hold to the general intent and letter of the law, emigration will
once again decline to a trickle. Only a very small proportion of the more
than half million who have indicated their wish to emigrate will qualify to
do so because relatively few potential emigrants have relatives outside of
the Soviet Union. The current trend appears to be away from the liberal
policies of the 1970's, with an effort directed towards encouraging these
individuals to stay, but to allow them a greater freedom of travel.
IV. CONCLUSION
Gorbachev, principally through glasnost, has made progress concern-
ing human rights. This progress is evidenced by the release of political
prisoners, relaxed censorship, and allowance of certain public demonstra-
tions. Areas which have shown little or no progress concern minority and
religious prisoners, and emigration. To the Western perception, the So-
viet hard-line position is softening.
Reflecting on the developments regarding the fate of the liberaliza-
tion experienced during the last year, it is reasonable to predict that there
will be more progress on human rights in the coming months. In the
longer term, one should not be euphoric about the prospects of glasnost
in this area. If Gorbachev is trying to square the circle by undertaking the
democratization of the Soviet system, as he shows every sign of doing, it
is unlikely that he will perdure in control for many more years. As destiny
would naturally have it, sooner or later the nomenklatura will most likely
eject him. The result would be that glasnost would find itself bound to
suffer in the unavoidable conservative response. What is crucial is that
the longer term future depends overwhelmingly on Gorbachev's fate. If
Gorbachev succeeds in promoting democratization and revitalizing the
economy smoothly, without threatening the party's control, he will en-
dure. Dissidents, believing that deception is the key word, claim that: 1)
these changes were directed towards enticing Westerners to participate in
a Moscow human rights conference, which would be furthered by the So-
viet government; 2) the surfacing of good will by the Soviets will demate-
rialize as soon as an arms-control agreement has been completed; and, 3)
the changes have been a skillful method of dealing with the dissidents,
since these changes were directed more at pacifying than bolstering the
dissent." Andrei Sakharov believes otherwise, stating that "objectively
something real is happening. How far it is going to go is a complicated
question. But I myself have decided that the situation has changed. '72
Western experts on the Soviet political scene feel that Gorbachev's
striking courage, forceful personality, skills of persuasion, and unceasing
70. Among those who have been permitted to leave during the last year are: losif Be-
gun, David Goldfarb, Vladimir Feltsman, Georgi Mikhailov, and Lev Blitschtein.
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1, at 1, col. 1.
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aggressiveness in keeping his opponents off balance, make him not only a
awe-inspiring politician, but also the type individual who can pull the
USSR out of a massive national crisis. In November 1987, Rozanne Ridg-
way, an assistant secretary of state, commented that Gorbachev has a
"very firm grip" on the Soviet Union."" Others reporting on the last Party
Congress feel that Gorbachev is a strong, long term leader, who will pro-
vide order and innovation.7 4 On the other side of the prophesying coin,
one finds Richard Owen, who is skeptical about the success of
Gorbachev's reforms 7 5 and Martin Walker who feels that Gorbachev will
succeed only partially7 Standing in the forefront of successors to
Gorbachev should he fail, is Yegor Ligachev, who has voiced serious reser-
vations about glasnost, stressing the necessity for restraint.77 Of course,
these are merely predictions, but what is strongly evident is that if
Gorbachev fails in his efforts and is subsequently ousted, his human
rights policies will not only be swiftly, but also drastically reversed by his
successors. One can only quote a cynical dissident when asked how far
Gorbachev will go: "we shall see, we shall see."
7 8
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